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Abstract 
 
This article evaluates German local governments’ cost efficiency using a sample of 1021 
municipalities in the state of Baden-Württemberg for the year 2001. We thereby concentrate 
on overall or ‘global’ efficiency scores – rather than estimate efficiency for one particular 
service – and explicitly account for exogenous or non-discretionary influences. The latter not 
only corrects for influences possibly beyond the control of local policy-makers, but also 
allows some indication with respect to the determinants of such ‘global’ efficiency. Our 
results indicate that there is a substantial divergence in efficiency across municipalities 
despite a homogeneous institutional setting. As especially smaller municipalities appears less 
efficient, these results support a case for policy programs aimed at boundary reviews or more 
extensive inter-communal cooperation among small municipalities.  
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Lokale Staatliche Effizienz in deutschen Kommunen 
 
Dieser Beitrag evaluiert die lokale staatliche Kosteneffizienz auf der Basis der 
Datengrundlage von 1021 Kommunen im Bundesland Baden-Württemberg im Jahr 2001. 
Dabei konzentrieren wir uns auf die Ermittlung von „globalen“ Effizienzindikatoren anstelle 
der Effizienzanalyse bestimmter öffentlicher Dienstleistungen und berücksichtigen explizit 
exogene Umfeldbedingungen. Letzteres berücksichtigt den Einfluss von Faktoren, die sich der 
Kontrolle der lokalen politischen Akteure entziehen und macht Einblicke in die 
Determinanten der „globalen“ Effizienz möglich. Unsere Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass 
es trotz eines homogenen institutionellen Umfelds eine erhebliche Divergenz der Effizienz 
zwischen den Kommunen gibt. Weil besonders kleinere Kommunen als weniger effizient 
erscheinen, unterstützen diese Ergebnisse politische Bemühungen zur Überprüfung des 
räumlichen Zuschnitts von Gemeinden oder einen Ausbau der interkommunalen Kooperation 
unter den kleinen Kommunen. 
 
Keywords: Lokale staatliche Leistung, Stochastic frontier analysis, deutsche Kommunen. 
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1. Introduction 
A substantial literature on vote and popularity functions illustrates that voters tend to be fiscal 
conservatives, and generally dislike paying taxes. Indeed, there is a significant political cost 
of taxation in the sense that it reduces politicians’ popularity or re-election odds (e.g., 
Niskanen, 1975; Peltzman, 1992; Vermeir and Heyndels, 2006; Geys and Vermeir, 2008a, b; 
Geys, 2010). Yet, the public goods provided as a result of tax revenues are commonly 
appreciated. Both elements taken together – i.e., reluctance to pay taxes, but appreciation of 
public good provision – suggest that voters are likely to care strongly about a cost-efficient 
provision of public goods. This is nothing new. Nevertheless, despite this wide-ranging 
interest in efficient governments, studies measuring the efficiency of the public sector have 
thus far mainly focused on efficiency in particular areas of public good provision such as 
waste collection, police services, child care, road maintenance, public libraries and so on (for 
reviews, see De Borger and Kerstens, 2000, and Worthington and Dollery, 2000; recent 
contributions include Bönisch, 2011; De Witte and Geys, 2011; Monten and Thater, 2011). 
One obvious reason for this is that ‘composite’ or ‘global’ efficiency measurements are more 
difficult to implement (e.g., because appropriate indicators for the quantity and quality of 
public outputs are hard to define at such general level). Even so, they are of considerable 
importance as single-policy analyses may provide a biased indication of governments’ overall 
efficiency (i.e., a government efficiently providing, say, education services need not be 
equally efficient in a range of other tasks). 
In this article, we evaluate German local government efficiency from a general perspective for 
all municipalities in one state (i.e., Baden-Württemberg) in one year (i.e., 2001) using a 
stochastic parametric frontier approach. While we are not the first to analyze overall local 
government efficiency (for an excellent review of early contributions, see De Borger and 
Kerstens, 2000; more recent articles include Sampaio De Sousa and Stosic, 2005; Hindriks 
and Gerard, 2005; Geys, 2006; Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007; Borge et al., 2008; Geys and 
Moesen, 2009a, b), our central innovation lies in providing one of the first global efficiency 
assessments for German local governments. While Kalb et al. (2012) provide another recent 
contribution in this direction, their contribution is very descriptive and focuses exclusively on 
an international comparative perspective. In comparison, our aim here is more prescriptive in 
the sense that our efficiency estimation is employed as a tool (rather than constitutes the 
outcome aimed at) to make inferences about public policies towards local public finances and 
municipal restructuring (by linking them to recent work on the effect of demographic change 
on local public finances; e.g., Geys et al., 2008). While future cross-checks for further 
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German states are desirable, the paper’s focus on the municipalities of one single state has the 
advantage of a common institutional environment. German states differ, for example, with 
respect to the municipal duties of service provision, which are, to a considerable extent, 
defined by state law. Also, the states’ grant systems, which partially finance the municipal 
level and which set incentives for service provision, differ considerably in their generosity 
and construction. Thus, concentration on one German state eliminates distortions from these 
types of heterogeneity and still offers considerable variation of municipal characteristics and a 
sufficiently large number of observations (see below). 
Our main results show that, on average, municipalities in Baden-Württemberg produce their 
output with costs approximately 12% to 14% higher than the most efficient municipalities in 
the sample. Small municipalities appear particularly inefficient. While this leaves some 
leeway for improvements in efficiency without resorting to politically costly tax increases to 
close unbalanced budgets, it suggests that future population decline might put severe strain on 
some local governments (see also Geys et al., 2008). We also find that efficiency estimates 
are substantially affected by population density and the political fragmentation of local 
governments – supporting the importance of controlling for environmental characteristics in 
the measurement of local government efficiency. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional 
setting of the German local governments and thereby clarifies the context of local public 
decision-making. Section 3 introduces the concept and measurement of government efficiency 
and presents the results from an assessment of the German municipalities in the year 2001. 
Conclusions are drawn in section 4. 
 
2. German local institutional setting 
Baden-Württemberg consists of 1111 municipalities ranging in size from 98 inhabitants in the 
smallest municipality (Böllen) to almost 600,000 inhabitants in the largest one (Stuttgart). The 
institutional setting is the same in all these municipalities (such that our analysis will be 
unaffected by the institutional design of government). That is, municipal political institutions 
consist on the one hand of the local council, which is elected every five years and is the main 
decision-making body of the municipalities. On the other hand, there is a directly elected 
major (eight-year terms), who acts as chairman of the municipal council. Both institutions 
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have their own statutory responsibilities, although the major has significant agenda-setting 
powers.1 
Though the municipalities constitute the lowest level of government in Germany, they still 
assume significant responsibilities at the expenditure side on three types of tasks.2 Firstly, 
local governments face voluntary tasks. The municipalities are not obliged to perform these 
tasks but they can assume responsibility for them if they so desire. Examples are cultural 
affairs (e.g. library, museum, theatre), social affairs (e.g. residential home for the elderly, 
welfare centre), sport facilities (e.g. public swimming pools, sports fields), entertainment 
facilities (e.g. hiking trails), traffic facilities (e.g. tram, harbour), partnership with foreign 
municipalities and municipal business development. The second type of tasks can be labelled 
as duties without instruction. These have to be performed by the municipalities, but do not 
involve detailed prescriptions imposed by a higher-level government concerning how local 
governments should perform these tasks. Examples from tasks in this category are the lighting 
and cleaning of public roads, the creation, support and expansion of graveyards, the 
construction of (municipal) roads, children playgrounds, the fire department, waste disposal 
and so on. Finally, there are duties with instruction. Local governments are obliged to perform 
the tasks, and the state imposes detailed regulations on how municipalities should perform 
them. Therefore, the implementation of these tasks is predetermined by the state. An example 
would be the running of local police authorities. 
The institutional setting is complicated by the existence of a further federal layer in between 
the municipalities and the state, the districts (“Landkreise”). In Baden-Württemberg, 35 such 
districts exist, and they have a double function: On the one hand, they are state authorities and 
the legal supervisors of their municipalities. On the other hand, they also provide municipal 
services which cannot be efficiently provided by (small) municipalities. Here, they are mainly 
active in the provision of streets, public transport, hospitals, waste management and some 
social programmes. The districts are financed through cost-sharing of the municipalities for 
which the district services are provided. Due to their low number and very distinct function, 
the districts are not included in our analysis and we return to possible consequences in the 
discussion of results. 
 
3. German local government efficiency 
                                                 
1  We should note here that, contrary to the state or federal level, the formation of governing majorities within 
the local council is not institutionalized in the local law of Baden-Württemberg. Nonetheless, their existence 
is uncontested. These inter-party cooperations are used to facilitate and, to a certain extent, control the 
formation of opinions and decision-making. 
2  A more detailed classification and description of these tasks is given in Gern (2005). 
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Efficiency in the production of public services is one degree of freedom in local communities’ 
policy agenda. Hence, the measurement of efficiency in local public good production lays the 
methodological basis to study the link between population size and cost pressures. Moreover, 
it allows a first look at the extent to which municipalities might be able to respond to adverse 
economic, fiscal or demographic shocks. Low efficiency scores for municipalities today 
should thereby not be (exclusively) interpreted as leeway for cost savings tomorrow once 
population shrinkage occurs. This would effectively be rather naive. On the contrary, current 
inefficiencies are more likely to hint towards poor (historical) performance in terms of 
adjusting service production to a changing environment and an inability to provide public 
services in the least costly way. Public entities that are currently inefficient may therefore be 
expected to be particularly severely hit by the changing size and structure of their population. 
Baden-Württemberg is a state with a more stable population compared to most eastern and 
northern German states, due to its positive migration balance with the rest of Germany. 
Nevertheless, demographic change also affects this state to a considerable extent. According 
to current projections (all data cited originate from: Statistisches Landesamt Baden-
Württemberg, 2009) the state’s population will shrink from 10.7 million inhabitants today to 
9.7 million in the year 2050. More dramatic is the change in the age composition, which can 
affect the production potential and the required types of municipal services: The share of 
people aged 60 years and above is projected to increase from 24 percent today to 39 percent in 
the year 2050. Furthermore, the distribution of population across the space is expected to 
change: Some districts are expected to lose five percent of their current population already by 
the year 2025 with more dramatic shrinking afterwards. 
 
3.1. Public inputs, outputs and exogenous constraints 
Efficiency measurement relies on estimating the relation between inputs and outputs to the 
public production function, taking into account possible constraints that lie beyond the control 
of the public service provider. While we will provide more details on the methodology to 
estimate local government efficiency scores in section 3.2., it is important to first discuss the 
key ingredients to any efficiency analysis: i.e., inputs, outputs and exogenous constraints. To 
determine which input, output and background variables to include in the analysis, we rely on 
previous literature studying local government efficiency (e.g. Vanden Eeckaut et al., 1993; De 
Borger et al., 1994; De Borger and Kerstens, 1996; Geys and Moesen, 2009a, b; Kalb et al., 
2012). Following this ‘common standard’ has the advantage that our results remain 
comparable with these studies. As our prime input variable (C), we employ total current 
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primary expenditures in the municipality in 2001. This includes all spending on the current 
budget except interest and amortization repayments from local public debts (although 
including these debt service costs does not affect the results in any significant manner; details 
available upon request). Spending from the capital budget is ignored as decisions to invest in 
large infrastructure projects are infrequent events and thus tend to inflate spending in the year 
they occur. Given the cross-sectional nature of our analysis, focus on the current budget 
avoids distortions resulting from fluctuating investments.  
 
To measure the level of local public good provision, we include six output variables that 
relate to important responsibilities of the German local governments with respect to social, 
educational, recreational and infrastructure services: (a) the number of students in local public 
schools (“Grund- and Hauptschulen”), (b) the number of kindergarten places,3 (c) the surface 
of public recreational facilities, (d) the total population, (e) the population over age 65, and (f) 
the number of employees paying social security contributions. The same set of variables has 
also been employed by Kalb et al. (2012). While they should best be seen as proxies for the 
actual outputs provided by the local governments, these various indicators have been chosen 
in an explicit attempt to cover a large share of actual outlays by the German local 
governments in terms of their true responsibilities. 
 
Finally, we include two sets of background variables (socio-economic and political) in the 
model to accommodate the fact that municipal governments face certain constraints that are 
beyond their direct control and/or hard to affect substantially in the short term. Controlling for 
these elements directly in the estimation of public sector efficiency tries to level the playing 
field between municipalities differentially affected by such constraints, and thus provides a 
more reasonable estimate of their true (in)efficiency. The socio-economic background 
variables include population density (inhabitants per are) and the number of unemployed in 
relation to total population. Population density proxies the rural/urban divide and is included 
under the argument that it can influence the ability of the authority to concentrate provision of 
the local public services (Stevens, 2005). Furthermore, it proxies the heterogeneity of property 
prices, which tend to differ substantially between rural and urban municipalities (and may 
thereby affect the cost situation of municipalities). While high population density might entail 
                                                 
3  Only the total number of public and private kindergarten places of the year 2002 was available. While it 
would be preferred to use only the number of public kindergarten places, the addition of private 
kindergartens may not be overly problematic. The reason is that these places also imply an ‘organisational’ 
burden for the local government.  
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cost advantages due to regional concentration of services, higher property costs in urban areas 
(and other problems of agglomeration) may render production more costly. The overall effect 
on efficiency is therefore ambiguous. A similar ambiguity emerges for the unemployment rate 
since it implies a) higher spending on unemployment and housing benefits (a ‘cost effect’) and 
b) lower demand for high-cost (or high-quality) public services (demand for which is likely to 
increase with income levels) (a ‘preference effect’). As a political background variable, we 
include the Herfindahl index to measure political concentration or monopolization in the local 
council. It is calculated using seat shares of the main national parties (CDU, FDP, SPD, 
GRÜNE) and of the so-called ‘free voter unions’.4 High concentration (or low fragmentation) 
may be an indication of low political competition and might therefore reduce efficiency (cf. 
Ashworth et al., 2006).5 The summary statistics of the input, output and environmental 
variables can be found in table A2 of appendix A. 
 
The analysis below will be based on the performance of a single year, 2001, which demands 
some reflections on possible special period circumstances and their impact. From a business 
cycle perspective, the year 2001 was a normal year with a real GDP growth of 2.7 percent of 
Baden-Württemberg – which lies very much in line with the preceding five-year growth 
average (2.6 percent) (Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg, 2011b). Later years 
would be more problematic given the subsequent phase of recession and stagnation lasting 
from 2002 up to 2005. On the expenditure side of municipalities, the year 2001 was likewise a 
year without any significant abnormalities: Personal expenditures increased moderately by 1.4 
percent (Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg, 2011a). However, the year 2001 is 
characterized by increasing municipal debt in Baden-Württemberg, while the level of debt had 
been declining before the turn of the millenium. This indicates a higher fiscal stress in that 
particular year. Nevertheless, we are confident that this debt development does not distort our 
approach in an important way. Our cost measure, as described above, is primary current 
expenditure and is independent from the financing side of the budget. Our six output measures 
hardly fluctuate largely in the short-run since they are largely driven by fixed or very slowly 
moving population characteristics. Only the number of employees paying social security 
                                                 
4  ‘Free voter unions’ are loose federations of persons not belonging to specific political parties and exist only 
at the local level. 
5  Still, even in the absence of (strong) opposition parties, there may still be substantial competition for 
political office when there is fierce competition within the majority party (or parties). While the causal 
nature of the relations between efficiency and the control variables is not at the heart of the present article, 
we should also note that efficiency may induce political concentration, rather than the other way around. We 
are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.  
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contributions will react to the business cycle, which is, however, uncritical given the normal 
cyclical situation in the year of analysis. 
 
3.2. Efficiency estimation: empirical approaches6 
Determining the efficiency of a given number of decision-making units firstly requires the 
selection of a set of input-output combinations that designate efficient behaviour (i.e. those 
combinations where the inputs are most productively used). Then, in a second step, one can 
designate deviations from this ‘best practice frontier’ as inefficiency. Both these steps have 
been addressed in a number of different ways in the literature (for an introduction, see Lovell, 
1993). Specifically, the best practice frontier can be generated either parametrically or non-
parametrically. In non-parametric approaches such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA; 
Farrell, 1957) or Free Disposal Hull (FDH; De Prins et al., 1984), the frontier is generated as 
a piecewise linear envelopment of the data. Parametric approaches, on the other hand, 
determine the best practice frontier on the basis of a specific functional form using advanced 
econometric techniques. In evaluating deviations from this best practice frontier, early studies 
interpreted any deviation as inefficiency (a deterministic approach). This, however, is 
problematic since observed levels of inputs and outputs in real-world applications may be 
subject to measurement errors or other stochastic influences. In addition, even communities 
with an identical institutional setting may differ substantially in natural (e.g. geographical) or 
socio-economic (e.g. extent of unemployment etc.) restrictions on public service provision, 
which may even further distort the picture. To the extent that this is the case, one should 
attempt to differentiate between these ‘errors’ and inefficiency (using a stochastic approach). 
 
We build on the stochastic, parametric approach to efficiency measurement developed by 
Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). At the risk of over-
simplification, this methodological approach essentially relies on the estimation of a 
production or cost function upon which “inefficiency is identified with [the] disturbances in 
[this] regression model” (Greene, 1993, 68). In other words, observed deviations from the 
estimated frontier isoquant are interpreted as indicative of the inefficiency of a given decision-
making unit. Importantly, however, given the possible presence of measurement errors in the 
input and output variables employed, not the entire deviation from optimal performance is 
necessarily reflecting inefficient behaviour (see above). Fortunately, to distinguish between 
measurement error and inefficiency, stochastic approaches to efficiency measurement provide 
                                                 
6  For more details, see Geys and Moesen (2009a). 
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the opportunity to (non-trivially) separate the observed deviations from optimal performance 
into random white noise and inefficiency. Technically, and employing a translogarithmic 
specification (cf. Christensen et al., 1973), a parametric frontier model can be written as 
(dropping subscripts for decision-making units for convenience): 
 ln C = α + 
ε
λβ
=
+++ ∑ ∑∑ = == uvyyy q
s
r r
s
q rqr
s
r r 1 11
lnln2
1ln  (1) 
where C designates the input indicator (which in effect can be interpreted as the money 
equivalent of multiple inputs), y indicates the various output indicators, s points to the number 
of outputs incorporated in the model and βr and λ rq are parameters to be estimated. The 
translogarithmic function in equation (1) extends the more basic Cobb-Douglas type cost or 
production function. Specifically, in a Cobb-Douglas function, the third term on the right 
hand side of equation (1) is absent: i.e. only the (logged) levels of the outputs are included 
(i.e., ln yr) and not the squared values, nor the cross-product terms (i.e., ln yr  ln yq with r, q = 
1,…,s). Obviously, the use of Cobb-Douglas versus translogarithmic functional form can be 
tested by assessing whether the coefficients λrq are jointly significantly different from 0, and 
we report both sets of results below. 
 
As mentioned, the parametric method allows one to distinguish between the effects of 
measurement error and inefficiency. This is achieved by introducing a composed error term 
consisting of a symmetric component (v) (generally assumed to be white noise) and a one-
sided non-negative component ( 0≥u ) representing inefficiency. The latter component is 
mostly assumed to follow a half-normal or a truncated normal distribution (cf. De Borger and 
Kerstens, 1996; Méon and Weill, 2005). Both error components are assumed to be 
independent and uncorrelated. While estimation of equation (1) provides values for the 
composed error term (v + u), Jondrow et al. (1982) and Bauer (1983) show that, for any 
organisation i, the conditional distribution of ui given (vi + ui) contains all available 
information about ui. As a consequence, this information can be used to generate point 
estimates for the inefficiency component of any given decision-making unit i. One can 
thereby either build on the mean or the mode of this conditional distribution (see Jondrow et 
al., 1982; Bauer, 1983), though both generally lead to comparable results in empirical 
applications (hence, we will only report the results based on the mean of the conditional 
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distribution in section 3.3). These point estimates indicate to what extent inputs can be 
reduced without reducing current output levels.7 
 
Two possible problems should be mentioned. Firstly, cost function based approaches along 
the lines of equation (1) could be challenging due to heterogeneity of factor costs across the 
jurisdictions under scrutiny. Fortunately, factor price divergence is not substantially affecting 
our application since the costs of labour and capital are identical for the municipalities of 
Baden-Württemberg (i.e. they face the same interest rates and wages). Interest rate 
homogeneity is given by the fact that a) all municipalities have access to the same capital 
market and b) the federal government guarantees the absence of differences in risk premiums 
for all German jurisdictions. Identical wages are guaranteed via a uniform collective labour 
agreement. 
 
Secondly, the efficiency estimates as derived from equation (1) treat all municipalities on the 
same footing. However, exogenous (or non-discretionary) influences may shape local 
government performance (Battese and Coelli, 1995; Stevens, 2004). Indeed, certain 
characteristics of a municipality may affect how successful the local government is in 
carrying out its tasks, even though it cannot affect these elements in the short (or even long) 
run. Examples of such external forces are the geographic characteristics of the area or the 
socio-economic make-up or density of the population. A municipality in a hilly region is 
likely to spend more money on a given level of road infrastructure, but should therefore not 
necessarily be deemed less efficient in carrying out this task. Disregarding the effect of such 
background factors can thus lead to an overestimation of government inefficiency. We 
address this issue by assuming that the inefficiency term (u) in the error of equation (1) is a 
function of a set of background variables (cf. Battese and Coelli, 1995). In other words, and as 
discussed in Coelli (1996), u is “assumed to be independently distributed as truncations at 
zero of the N(mit, 2uσ ) distribution where mit = δ zit” (p. 7). In this extension, zit is a vector of 
background variables (for municipality i and time period t) which are expected to influence 
(in)efficiency and δ  is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Technically, this corrects the 
derived efficiency measures for the existence of non-discretionary factors and leads to the 
following modified model: 
                                                 
7  Building the best practice frontier based on the decision-making units at hand by definition implies that the 
ensuing efficiency measures are relative rather than absolute measures – and only have meaning within the 
specific sample employed. This clearly holds for all the procedures brought forward, and should be kept in 
mind in empirical applications. 
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where the error term of equation (3), w, is defined by the truncation of the normal distribution 
with zero mean and variance 2σ  (Battese and Coelli, 1995). The latter assumption assures 
that the inefficiency component u can only take values bigger than or equal to zero. Clearly, a 
complete coverage of all relevant y and zi would be necessary to derive the real extent of 
inefficiency – and the possible cost cuts given the municipality’s output. As data limitations 
make this unattainable, we must be cautious to equate observed ‘inefficiencies’ with 
realizable cost savings. Nevertheless, even with an incomplete coverage, u offers valuable 
insights in the municipalities’ ‘value for money’. These subtleties should, however, be kept in 
mind if we speak about inefficiencies in the following empirical analysis. 
 
3.3. Efficiency results 
The results – obtained using FRONTIER 4.1 (developed by Coelli, 1996) – are summarized in 
Table 1. Specifically, we estimate three related models. The first disregards the effect of 
background variables and could be seen as a ‘baseline’ model (presented in columns (1) and 
(4)). In the second model, we include the socio-economic background variables 
(unemployment and population density) (columns (2) and (5)) while in the third model we 
also incorporate the Herfindahl index (columns (3) and (6)). In each case, we estimate both a 
Cobb-Douglas (columns (1), (2), (3)) and translogarithmic cost function (columns (4), (5), 
(6)). By definition, the municipalities lying on the best practice frontier reach efficiency 
scores of one, the other, less efficient exhibit efficiency scores that are bigger than one. Note 
that the estimated best-practice frontier is effectively shifted outwards until it just ‘touches’ 
the most efficient municipality when we calculate the (in)efficiency values reported in Table 
1. Hence, only one municipality will generally be ‘efficient’ and thereby constitute the most 
efficient comparison case (making the reported efficiency measures relative rather than 
absolute indicators; see also note 7). Full results of all these estimations are provided in table 
A1 of appendix A. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics on the cost efficiency of the local governments in Baden
 Württemberg in 2001 (N=1021) 
 Cobb-Douglas Translog 
 No control 
variables 
Socio-
economic 
All control 
variables 
No control 
variables 
Socio-
economic 
All control 
variables 
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 (1) controls (2) (3) (4) controls (5) (6) 
Average 1.229 1.138 1.141 1.202 1.120 1.122 
Standard deviation 0.203 0.176 0.179 0.159 0.134 0.136 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Maximum 4.355 4.566 4.499 3.500 3.708 3.666 
Number efficient 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
As can be seen from table 1, disregarding background variables (columns (1) and (4)), local 
governments in Baden-Württemberg are characterized by cost levels which are approximately 
20% to 23% above the efficient frontier. When we include political and socio-economic 
background variables into the estimation, inefficiency is reduced (as expected). Still, costs 
remain roughly 12% to 14% above the efficient level (column (3) and (6)). Although, as 
explained above, we should be cautious to equate these inefficiencies with potential cost cuts, 
it should be kept in mind that the frontier generated by the sample of municipalities will by 
construction be at least as high as the ‘true’ frontier. This implies that the efficiency ratings 
provided in table 1 are best regarded as a lower limit of ‘true’ inefficiency. 
 
It is clear that the Baden-Württemberg local governments show a substantial heterogeneity 
with regard to their ‘value for money’ (as represented by the standard deviation in 
inefficiency scores). The variation in efficiency ratings is also represented in figure 2. This 
histogram shows the number of municipalities (on the Y-axis) with a given level of 
inefficiency (on the X-axis), using results from the translogarithmic specifications. Light-grey 
cubes are inefficiency scores without control variables, black cubes represent inefficiency 
scores when controlling for socio-economic background variable and dark-grey cubes depict 
inefficiency scores when including all control variables.  
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Figure 2: Baden-Württemberg local governments’ cost inefficiency in 2001 (N=1021) 
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Note: Results based on translogarithmic cost function. 
 
It is obvious from figure 2 that the distribution of inefficiency has a large right-hand tail. Most 
municipalities have a limited degree of inefficiency, though some are deemed to be very 
inefficient. Although a positive reading of our results might suggest that currently inefficient 
municipalities have some leeway for improvements in efficiency without resorting to 
extensive, and politically costly, tax increases to (re-)balance their budgets, it remains 
doubtful that such municipalities are able to increase their efficiency under adverse 
conditions. To the extent that municipalities remain equally (in)efficient in the future, public 
finances are likely to become more severely constrained in inefficient municipalities (e.g., due 
to population change, see Geys et al., 2008). Not shown in the figure is that mainly the 
smaller municipalities (especially those under 3000 inhabitants) are found to be relatively 
inefficient while municipalities between approximately 6000 and 9000 inhabitants are deemed 
most efficient (details available upon request). One key driving force behind this relative 
inefficiency of especially the smallest municipalities appears to be their greater inability to 
exploit economies of scale in the provision of public goods. Indeed, smaller municipalities in 
Baden-Württemberg operate under conditions where the cost of public provisions increases 
significantly slower than one-to-one with population size increases. In other words, costs per 
capita would reduce by increasing the average scale of production. As also shown in more 
detail in Geys et al. (2008), such economies of scale become (close to) exhausted once 
population size exceeds the threshold of approximately 5500 to 6000 inhabitants. From a 
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policy perspective, this suggests that municipal mergers among particularly the smallest 
municipalities may prove beneficial in reaching a more optimal size of government at the 
local level (taking, of course, into account the practical feasibility of, and the local 
sensitivities involved in, such a policy). Still, although economies of scale clearly play an 
important role in the inefficiency of smaller municipalities, our data, unfortunately, do not 
allow us to examine the potential importance of other factors such as (concerns about) the 
relative lack of professional mayors and/or more experiences administrators in smaller 
municipalities. To the extent that such factors play a role as well, municipal mergers might be 
insufficient to tackle the relative inefficiency of small jurisdictions, and measures more 
directly aimed at improvements in local governance should likewise be contemplated. 
 
It must, moreover, be stressed that our analysis excludes the costs of service provision 
through the district level, which the municipalities finance through their contributions (see 
section 2). Since these contributions are not part of our dependent variable due to lack of 
sufficiently detailed data, the analysis remains necessarily incomplete. If district provision of 
services plays a comparable role for all municipalities, this would not affect our results. 
However, with standard economies of scale arguments we would expect district provision of 
services to be more important for smaller municipalities. From that perspective, municipal 
cost numbers might be biased downwards for smaller municipalities. This would bias our 
results towards a seemingly larger efficiency of smaller municipalities. This strengthens our 
belief in our result that mainly the smaller municipalities show larger inefficiencies. Our 
results could in effect be taken as a conservative estimate of smaller municipalities’ 
inefficiencies. 
 
Before concluding, it may be of interest to point to the findings of the non-discretionary 
variables included in the model. These results, provided in table A1 of appendix A, indicate 
that the unemployment rate does not robustly affect inefficiency. Hence, no clear statement of 
the effect of unemployment on the (technical) efficiency in the municipalities of Baden-
Württemberg can be made. Population density, on the other hand, significantly increases 
measured inefficiency in all specifications. This indicates that cost disadvantages resulting 
from, say, higher property prices outweigh agglomeration advantages. This result may also 
reflect the fact that large cities tend to have central place functions, such as the arts and 
culture (cf. Heilbrun, 1992), which significantly affects their cost structure. Finally, as 
expected, political concentration (proxied by the Herfindahl index) significantly reduces 
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efficiency. This indicates that high levels of political competition are associated with high 
efficiency – a result in line with our theoretical expectations (see also Ashworth et al., 2006). 
 
4. Concluding discussion 
This article investigated that overall (or ‘global’) cost efficiency of local public good 
provision in German municipalities. We use a sample of more than 1000 municipalities in the 
state of Baden-Württemberg for the empirical analysis. Our first major finding in this context 
is the substantial heterogeneity in the efficiency of public service production – even under a 
uniform institutional setting as it is given for the municipalities in Baden-Württemberg. We 
show, that, on average, the municipalities of Baden-Württemberg produce their output with 
costs roughly 12% to 14% above the efficient frontier as identified by means of a stochastic 
frontier analysis - even when taking account of different socio-economic and political 
constraints. Such inefficiency seems especially concentrated in smaller municipalities. At first 
sight, this unexploited potential might appear as a cushion for bad times once population 
shrinkage materializes. A more pessimistic interpretation, however, is to take these 
inefficiencies as an indicator of poor performance generally, and with respect to adverse 
economic and fiscal developments in particular. Following this view, municipalities which are 
characterized by low efficiency scores under the current demographic situation are likely to 
incur significant difficulties in the future, when demographic decline gains force. One can 
indeed expect that inefficiencies augment when these low performing municipalities are faced 
with the challenge to adjust their public services to, for instance, the needs of a changing and 
shrinking population. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1: Results of the multi-output frontier estimation 
Variable Cobb-Douglas Translog (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
constant ( 0β ) 8.303*** 
(55.864) 
8.590*** 
(58.270) 
8.516*** 
(60.753) 
11.455*** 
(7.946) 
11.627*** 
(6.695) 
12.953*** 
(4.250) 
A: students in public 
schools 
-0.008 
(-0.924) 
-0.009 
(-0.953) 
-0.002 
(-0.202) 
0.096 
(0.485) 
0.017 
(0.094) 
0.051 
(0.255) 
B: kindergarten 
places 
0.059* 
(1.903) 
0.077*** 
(2.661) 
0.069** 
(2.411) 
-0.066 
(-0.116) 
-0.050 
(-0.099) 
0.181 
(0.194) 
C: recovery area 0.019** 
(2.214) 
0.020** 
(2.448) 
0.018** 
(2.158) 
0.623*** 
(2.709) 
0.583*** 
(2.674) 
0.552** 
(2.420) 
D: total population 0.680*** 
(12.066) 
0.631*** 
(11.737) 
0.641*** 
(12.000) 
-0.999 
(-0.957) 
-0.922 
(-0.658) 
-2.161 
(-0.936) 
E: population older 
than 65 
0.140*** 
(3.682) 
0.151*** 
(4.211) 
0.157*** 
(4.367) 
-0.022 
(-0.024) 
-0.099 
(-0.095) 
0.904 
(0.660) 
F: number of social 
insured employees 
0.133*** 
(10.960) 
0.137*** 
(11.798) 
0.133*** 
(12.381) 
0.862*** 
(2.885) 
0.908*** 
(3.475) 
0.908*** 
(3.203) 
A2 
   
-0.004 
(-0.517) 
-0.002 
(-0.235) 
-0.002 
(-0.209) 
B2 
   
0.021 
(0.487) 
0.025 
(0.596) 
0.025 
(0.554) 
C2 
   
0.000 
(0.039) 
0.002 
(0.231) 
0.002 
(0.331) 
D2 
   
0.221 
(0.946) 
0.189 
(0.634) 
0.445 
(0.997) 
E2 
   
-0.008 
(-0.047) 
-0.036 
(-0.227) 
0.071 
(0.408) 
F2 
   
0.101*** 
(6.797) 
0.091*** 
(6.289) 
0.091*** 
(6.219) 
F * E 
   
-0.048 
(-0.656) 
-0.025 
(-0.366) 
-0.007 
(-0.104) 
F * D 
   
-0.327*** 
(-2.902) 
-0.331*** 
(-3.329) 
-0.340*** 
(-3.175) 
F * C 
   
0.022 
(1.433) 
0.017 
(1.177) 
0.021 
(1.412) 
F * B 
   
0.153** 
(2.456) 
0.152*** 
(2.830) 
0.145** 
(2.436) 
F * A 
   
0.003 
(0.227) 
0.005 
(0.328) 
0.003 
(0.195) 
E * D 
   
0.159 
(0.381) 
0.192 
(0.444) 
-0.182 
(-0.336) 
E * C 
   
0.104* 
(1.765) 
0.102* 
(1.818) 
0.090 
(1.584) 
E * B 
   
-0.315 
(-1.537) 
-0.286 
(-1.374) 
-0.149 
(-0.582) 
E * A 
   
0.033 
(0.538) 
0.008 
(0.139) 
0.010 
(0.154) 
D * C 
   
-0.178** 
(-2.023) 
-0.171** 
(-2.048) 
-0.157* 
(-1.811) 
D * B 
   
0.108 
(0.513) 
0.101 
(0.455) 
-0.021 
(-0.061) 
D * A 
   
-0.041 
(-0.475) 
0.004 
(0.046) 
-0.002 
(-0.025) 
C * B 
   
0.004 
(0.084) 
0.006 
(0.133) 
-0.004 
(-0.076) 
C * A 
   
0.008 
(0.672) 
0.006 
(0.529) 
0.008 
(0.692) 
B * A    -0.001 -0.032 -0.031 
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(-0.12) (-0.574) (-0.484) 
constant ( 0δ ) 
 
-7.394* 
(-1.780) 
-7.539*** 
(-21.180)  
-6.356** 
(-2.496) 
-7.038* 
(-1.913) 
unemployed as share 
of population  
0.085 
(0.684) 
0.224*** 
(5.355)  
-0.138** 
(-2.453) 
0.111 
(1.360) 
population density 
 
0.219** 
(2.070) 
0.202*** 
(21.069)  
0.063** 
(2.405) 
0.099* 
(1.884) 
Herfindahl index 
  
3.606*** 
(21.906)   
2.768** 
(1.974) 
 
Cobb-Douglas vs. 
translogarithmic 
  
 
  
 
125.376*** 
 
111.565*** 
 
106.867*** 
Note: N = 1021; All variables in natural logs except the socio-economic and political variables; *** denotes 
significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. Cobb-Douglas vs. translogarithmic tests the 
restriction that the coefficients for all quadratic and cross products terms are jointly insignificant. Both tests have 
a Chi2-distribution. 
 
 
Table A2: Summary statistics of the input, output and environmental variables for the 1021
 municipalities of Baden-Württemberg in 2001 
 
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Current primary expenditures (in 
mio. euros) 37.9 134.0 0.7 3230.0 
Students in public schools 649.9 1292.8 0.0 26342.0 
Kindergarten places 402.1 804.7 25.0 17195.0 
Recovery area (in are) 2401.5 5787.8 5.0 107540.0 
Total population 10369.7 26594.7 249.0 589037.0 
Population older than 65 1668.9 4481.3 35.0 98205.0 
Number of social insured 
employees (at place of work) 3753.2 14919.1 8.0 353801.0 
Unemployed as a share of total 
population (in %) 1.9 0.6 0.3 4.7 
Population density (inhabitants 
per are) 3.3 3.3 0.2 28.4 
Herfindahl index 0.5 0.3 0.2 1.0 
Source: Statistical office of Baden-Württemberg 
 
